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In the card game of poker, a bluff is a bet or raise made with a hand which is not thought to be the best hand. To bluff is to make such a bet. The objective of a bluff is to induce a fold by at least one opponent who holds a better hand. The size and frequency of a bluff determines its profitability to the bluffer. By extension, the term is often used outside the context of poker to describe the act of making threats one cannot execute.
A pure bluff, or stonecold bluff, is a bet or raise with an inferior hand that has little or no chance of improving. A player making a pure bluff believes he can win the pot only if all opponents fold. The pot odds for a bluff are the ratio of the size of the bluff to the pot. A pure bluff has a positive expectation (will be profitable in the long run) when the probability of being called by an opponent is lower than the pot odds for the bluff.
For example, suppose that after all the cards are out, a player holding a busted drawing hand decides that the only way to win the pot is to make a pure bluff. If the player bets the size of the pot on a pure bluff, the bluff will have a positive expectation if the probability of being called is less than 50%. Note, however, that the opponent may also consider the pot odds when deciding whether to call. In this example, the opponent will be facing 2to1 pot odds for the call. The opponent will have a positive expectation for calling the bluff if the opponent believes the probability the player is bluffing is at least 33%.
In games with multiple betting rounds, to bluff on one round with an inferior or drawing hand that might improve in a later round is called a semibluff. A player making a semibluff can win the pot two different ways: by all opponents folding immediately or by catching a card to improve the player's hand. In some cases a player may be on a draw but with odds strong enough that he is favored to win the hand. In this case his bet is not classified as a semibluff even though his bet may force opponents to fold hands with better current strength.
For example, a player in a stud poker game with four spadesuited cards showing (but none among their downcards) on the penultimate round might raise, hoping that his opponents believe he already has a flush. If his bluff fails and he is called, he still might be dealt a spade on the final card and win the showdown (or he might be dealt another nonspade and try his bluff again, in which case it is a pure bluff on the final round rather than a semibluff).
Bluffing may be more effective in some circumstances than others. Bluffs have a higher expectation when the probability of being called decreases. Several game circumstances may decrease the probability of being called (and increase the profitability of the bluff):
The opponent's current state of mind should be taken into consideration when bluffing. Under certain circumstances external pressures or events can significantly impact an opponent's decision making skills.
If a player bluffs too infrequently, observant opponents will recognize that the player is betting for value and will call with very strong hands or with drawing hands only when they are receiving favorable pot odds. If a player bluffs too frequently, observant opponents snap off his bluffs by calling or reraising. Occasional bluffing disguises not just the hands a player is bluffing with, but also his legitimate hands that opponents may think he may be bluffing with. David Sklansky, in his book The Theory of Poker, states "Mathematically, the optimal bluffing strategy is to bluff in such a way that the chances against your bluffing are identical to the pot odds your opponent is getting."
Optimal bluffing also requires that the bluffs must be performed in such a manner that opponents cannot tell when a player is bluffing or not. To prevent bluffs from occurring in a predictable pattern, game theory suggests the use of a randomizing agent to determine whether to bluff. For example, a player might use the colors of his hidden cards, the second hand on his watch, or some other unpredictable mechanism to determine whether to bluff.
Example (Texas Hold'em)
Again, let us return to the examples in The Theory of Poker:
when I bet my $100, creating a $300 pot, my opponent was getting 3to1 odds from the pot. Therefore my optimum strategy was . . . [to make] the odds against my bluffing 3to1.
Since the dealer will always bet with (nut hands) in this situation, he should bluff with (his) "Weakest hands/bluffing range" 1/3 of the time in order to make the odds 3to1 against a bluff.^{[1]}
Ex: On the last betting round (river), Worm has been betting a "semibluff" drawing hand with: A♠ K♠ on the board:
10♠ 9♣ 2♠ 4♣ against Mike's A♣ 10♦ hand.
The river comes out:
2♣
The pot is currently 30 dollars, and Worm is contemplating a 30 dollar bluff on the river. If Worm does bluff in this situation, he is giving Mike 2to1 pot odds to call with his two pair (10's and 2's).
Important: In these hypothetical circumstances, Worm will have the nuts 50% of the time, and be on a busted draw 50% of the time. Worm will bet the nuts (100%) of the time, and bet with a bluffing hand (using mixed optimal strategies):
^{[2]}
Where s is equal to the percentage of the pot that Worm is bluff betting with and x is equal to the percentage of busted draws Worm should be bluffing with to bluff optimally.
Pot = 30 dollars. Bluff bet = 30 dollars.
s = 30(pot) / 30(bluff bet) = 1.
Worm should be bluffing with his busted draws:
x = Where s = 1
Assuming 4 trials, Worm has the nuts 2 times, and has a busted draw 2 times. (EV = Expected Value)
Worm bets with the nuts (100% of the time) Worm bets with the nuts (100% of the time) Worm bets with a busted draw (50% of the time) Worm checks with a busted draw (50% of the time) Worm's EV = 60 dollars Worm's EV = 60 dollars Worm's EV = 30 dollars (if Mike folds) and 30 dollars (if Mike calls) Worm's EV = 0 dollars (since he will neither win the pot, nor lose 30 dollars on a bluff) Mike's EV = 30 dollars (because he would not have won the original pot, but lost to Worm's value bet on the end) Mike's EV = 30 dollars (because he would not have won the original pot, but lost to Worm's value bet on the end) Mike's EV = 60 dollars (if he calls, he'll win the whole pot, which includes Worm's 30 dollar bluff) and 0 dollars (if Mike folds, he can't win the money in the pot) Mike's EV = 30 dollars (assuming Mike checks behind with the winning hand, he will win the 30 dollar pot)Under the circumstances of this example: Worm will bet his nut hand 2 times, for every one time he bluffs against Mike's hand (assuming Mike's hand would lose to the nuts and beat a bluff). This means that (if he called all three bets) Mike would win 1 time, and lose two times, and would break even against 2to1 pot odds. This also means that Worm's odds against bluffing is also 2to1 (since he will value bet twice, and bluff once).
Say in this example, Worm decides to use the second hand of his watch to determine when to bluff (50% of the time). If the second hand of the watch is between 1 and 30 seconds, Worm will check his hand down (not bluff). If the second hand of the watch is between 31 and 60 seconds, Worm will bluff his hand. Worm looks down at his watch, and the second hand is at 45 seconds, so Worm decides to bluff. Mike folds his two pair saying, "the way you've been betting your hand, I don't think my two pair on the board will hold up against your hand." Worm takes the pot by using optimal bluffing frequencies.
Please note: This example is meant to illustrate how optimal bluffing frequencies work. Because it was an example, we assumed that Worm had the nuts 50% of the time, and a busted draw 50% of the time. In real game situations, this is not usually the case.
The purpose of optimal bluffing frequencies is to make the opponent (mathematically) indifferent between calling and folding. Optimal bluffing frequencies are based upon game theory and the Nash Equilibrium, and assist the player using these strategies to become unexploitable. By bluffing in optimal frequencies, you will typically end up breaking even on your bluffs (in other words, optimal bluffing frequencies are not meant to generate positive expected value from the bluffs alone). Rather, optimal bluffing frequencies allow you to gain more value from your "value bets," because your opponent is indifferent between calling or folding when you bet (regardless to whether it's a value bet or a bluff bet).^{[3]}
Although bluffing is most often considered a poker term, similar tactics are useful in other games as well. In these situations, a player makes a play that shouldn't be profitable unless an opponent misjudges it as being made from a position capable of justifying it. Since a successful bluff requires deceiving one's opponent, it occurs only in games where the players conceal information from each other. In games like chess and backgammon where both players can see the same board, they should simply make the best legal move available. Examples include: